The Saxony-Anhalt elections last Sunday did not come as a surprise, but they set a precedent: the AfD (Alternative for Germany), the anti-immigration, pro-Russian, and climate change denial party, secured 44% of the votes. With this, for the first time, a far-right force prevailed in regional elections in a German federal state since World War II.
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Taking advantage of this favorable wind, the AfD is looking with anticipation at its performance in the regional elections to be held on September 20 in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Berlin. All this while Chancellor Friedrich Merz, after the far-right setback in Saxony-Anhalt, promised a change of course for his government to regain “the sympathy of the citizens,” although he admitted that this “cannot be achieved in the short term.”
In an interview with La Tercera, Dutch political scientist Cas Mudde, an expert on radical right-wing parties, associate professor at the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Georgia, USA, and author, among other books, of The Far Right Today (2019), Populist Right Parties in Europe (2007), and Populism: A Very Short Introduction (with Cristóbal Rovira, 2017), texts considered global references on the subject, comments on the German political situation.
It seems repetitive: it appears that every few months, the AfD secures first place in some local election, generally in East Germany. In your opinion, does this specific victory in Saxony-Anhalt mark a turning point? Could it have greater repercussions on the German political landscape?
I don’t think it is a turning point, since, to begin with, it was widely expected. The result slightly exceeded the poll predictions. In fact, the AfD already obtained nearly 37% of the votes in the 2025 federal elections in that particular state.
The AfD is, by far, the most voted or second most voted party in almost all eastern states. Therefore, it seems more like an almost natural evolution, though not inevitable. Obviously, it reflects widespread discontent with the traditional political class. So it is more the natural continuation of the trend we have observed in recent years. In the sense that more and more people are dissatisfied with conventional politics, and in most countries, it is almost exclusively the far right that benefits from this.
Because, at least in the German political system, there is no left option considered outside the mainstream…
Certainly, in the context of East Germany, Die Linke is a well-known party that has been present practically from the beginning. And the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BWS) is a formation that, in reality, does not take much away from either Die Linke or the AfD.
Generally, the regions of former East Germany show a greater inclination to vote for the AfD. Is that advantage the party usually has in the eastern part of Germany moving to the West, or does the situation remain really different in each area?
The fact that the AfD is so successful in the East makes it seem like it is not as successful in the West. However, in the West, they get between 15% and 20%, a figure that is actually not much lower. I think the problem lies in that, being a much larger force in the East, the AfD in the West is often downplayed.
Although they are not as strong in the West as in the East, they remain, by far, the most successful far-right party of the post-war period also in West Germany.
In your opinion, is it appropriate or reductive to label the AfD as a Nazi party?
The AfD is among the most extreme of all far-right parties. They are not as openly neo-Nazi as Golden Dawn was in Greece, but they constantly flirt with National Socialism. They have many people in the party leadership who, in the past, were part of openly neo-Nazi organizations.
So, from that ideological perspective, they can be considered quite close. However, the context is very different: the Weimar Republic, in the early 20th century, was Germany’s first democratic system and had to face the trauma of defeat in World War I and a huge economic crisis, never really proving to work. This contrasts enormously with the Federal Republic of Germany, which emerged from the destruction of World War II, thanks to the “economic miracle,” becoming the most powerful country in Europe.
And therefore, it has a solid and, to some extent, popular democracy. This is important because even among AfD voters, many support democracy, although their party perhaps does not.
If they support democracy, why do they vote for the AfD? Is it simply a protest vote?
No, protest plays an important role, but it is not just a generic protest. Almost all of them are especially dissatisfied with immigration. That is why their view of their country also influences a lot. They are in favor of democracy, but at the same time, they have an ethnic, or even racial, conception of what it means to be German.
In that sense, what does this victory tell us about Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s and the CDU’s management?
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Germany is a federal state, which generally means that state elections do not necessarily reflect what will happen in federal elections. It should be noted that not only is the current federal government very unpopular: the CDU government in Saxony-Anhalt also enjoyed very little popularity and ran a poor campaign. That said, the national government is clearly in crisis: it fails to get anything done and Merz is perceived as ineffective.
And a tactic Merz employs, which, according to decades of evidence, fosters the growth of the far right, is constantly putting the immigration issue back on the table. They address the issue from the far-right perspective but do not substantially change their policies. In doing so, they are basically telling voters: “Look, the AfD is right.”
But at the same time, they do nothing about it. So people end up voting for the AfD.
On the other hand, the AfD is said to be a pro-Russian party. What are the real chances today that they will reach power at the national level? And from there, for example, implement pro-Russian policies or block support measures for Ukraine, as was the case with Viktor Orbán in Hungary.
I think it is unlikely. If we look at federal-level polls, the AfD hovers around 28% voting intention, a historically high figure for them. However, their pro-Russian agenda has virtually no support from any other party. The CDU, the Social Democrats, and the Greens still hold the majority of support and votes, so they will keep the AfD out of power at the federal level.
And this is not only due to their desire to retain power or ideological differences: it also influences that the vast majority of the business sector would reject an AfD government, as it would harm Germany’s reputation. Since Germany is an exporting country, a deterioration of its image leads to a drop in exports.
That said, there is a possibility that the AfD gains more weight in the general debate, as both citizens and other parties will try to curb its growth. I do not think this will necessarily affect policies on Russia or Ukraine, since, broadly speaking, these currently enjoy support in Germany.
If the AfD gains weight in the debate, it could lead to changes in policies such as immigration or education…
Yes. I think especially in immigration to some extent, as well as in environment and climate change. For example, reversing environmental protection measures under the pretext of helping farmers. Those are the two key areas: migration and climate in a broad sense.
But they already exert great influence, just like the far right in general. An example of this is the European People’s Party in Brussels, which has largely rolled back many of its European Green Deal policies and constantly toughens migration policy. Therefore, the room for maneuver is limited, as the dominant political current, especially on the right, is already deeply opposed to immigration.
Europe’s southern border is already the deadliest, and little more can be done apart from resorting to endless symbolic politics that do not provide real solutions. The only thing achieved with that is increasing the visibility of the issue, which leads people to feel the problem remains unresolved. Thus, the only way to solve it seems to be opting for the most extreme stance.
What is the situation of the left and center-left in Germany after these elections? How are they doing now that they are not in power, seeing that the conservative right is not managing to stop the rise of the AfD?
Overall, the left is weak and fragmented. This happens throughout Germany, but the situation in the east of the country is somewhat more problematic. If we look at national polls, for example, we see that the Greens are at 14%, the SPD at 12%, and Die Linke at 11%. That adds up to around 37%. A 37% split among three parties, when 20 years ago the SPD alone reached that figure.
There is no reason to think this fragmentation will change significantly in the future. They have different electorates: the SPD’s is very old, Die Linke’s is very young, and the Greens’ is mostly millennials. They present different profiles in terms of education level, place of residence, etc.
Logically, the SPD will not regain much ground, especially if it maintains that undefined and confusing centrist stance, as it is not attractive to young people.
So, the biggest problem for the left lies in the center-left. However, all left parties share a common difficulty: the inability to dominate the political debate, as it almost always focuses on identity and security issues linked to immigration, areas in which they tend to be weaker.
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